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LAW AND NONLEGAL NORMS
IN GOVERNMENT LAWYERS’ ETHICS:
DISCRETION MEETS LEGITIMACY
W. Bradley Wendel*
INTRODUCTION
This Essay is about the role of unwritten norms in the ethical decisionmaking of government lawyers. Because the ethical obligations of lawyers,
including government lawyers, are closely tied to the legal rights and
obligations of clients,1 this analysis necessarily depends on understanding the
relationship between written law and unwritten norms.2 As we all know,
however, written law leaves gaps, ambiguities, and zones of unregulated
discretion. Prosecutors in the United States, for example, have virtually
unreviewable discretion to decide who to investigate and charge, what
charges to bring, and whether to offer immunity in exchange for cooperation.
No one has a legal entitlement not to be prosecuted, nor does anyone else—
official or private citizen—have the power to compel a prosecutor to bring
charges.3 The president possesses nearly unconstrained discretion to grant
clemency to people convicted of criminal offenses.4 The impeachment
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established
by the William C. and Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust. This Essay was prepared for the
Colloquium entitled The Varied Roles, Regulation, and Professional Responsibilities of
Government Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and
Ethics on October 12, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the
Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1791 (2019).
1. I have argued this elsewhere and will not reargue it here. See generally W. BRADLEY
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers
in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 275 (2017). However, readers who believe
that the government lawyer’s ethical role ought to have something to do with the public
interest, justice, or the common good—not just the entitlements allocated to citizens by
positive law—may wish to rely on unwritten norms of democratic governance to support their
view. My hope is that this Essay has something new to contribute to that discussion.
2. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325
(2018); Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1797.
3. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
4. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated on many occasions that the president’s power to
grant pardons, conferred by Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, is not subject to
review or modification by Congress. See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974); Ex
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380
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power of Congress is constrained only by the Constitution’s requirement that
the president be charged with certain enumerated offenses, including the
open-ended phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”5 In other areas, a
government official may possess the legal authority to do something but may
nevertheless be criticized for exercising that authority contrary to standards
that are not reducible to positive law. For example, Jack Goldsmith argues
that Trump’s revocation of the security clearance of former CIA Director
John Brennan was “within the president’s power but also was an abuse of
power.”6 That criticism implies that there are extralegal norms that
government officials should consider even when they act within an area of
clearly authorized discretion.
The question is, what standards, norms, or ethical values, if any, constrain
the actions of lawyers advising government officials who exercise their
power within discretionary unwritten areas of the law? In other words, is
there a type of official discretion that is distinguishable from the exercise of
raw power or whimsical decision-making, despite being unconstrained by
positive law? If so, what is its relationship to positive law and its claim to
legitimate authority? This question is a jurisprudential one rather than a
consideration of official discretion from the point of view of the history of
constitutional law. The claim to be defended in this Essay is that the value
of legality—that is, a political ideal aimed at safeguarding against abuses of
power, which emphasizes a relationship of mutual respect between citizens
and those who govern—informs the exercise of discretion in the spaces left
unregulated by positive law.7 It is offered in a time in which the president

(1866); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). See generally JEFFREY
CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009); P. E. DIGESER, POLITICAL FORGIVENESS
(2001); KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1989); Robert L. Ehrlich, Pardons and Commutations: Observations from the Front Lines,
9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 669 (2013); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency
Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561 (2001); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:
Wrestling the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991); Harold J. Krent,
Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665 (2001);
Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the
President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000); Elizabeth Rapaport,
Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1501 (2000); Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability
and the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (1993); Mark Strasser, The
Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United States Constitution,
41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85 (2002).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
6. Jack Goldsmith, The Dangers in the Trump-Brennan Confrontation, LAWFARE (Aug.
20, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dangers-trump-brennan-confrontation
[https://perma.cc/D3T6-AWDH].
7. This argument is influenced by Jeremy Waldron’s thinking about the rule of law,
although to my knowledge Waldron has not expressed a view regarding legality in the absence
of positive law. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L.
REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Waldron, Concept]; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the
Importance of Procedure, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 3 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011)
[hereinafter Waldron, Procedure]; Jeremy Waldron, Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, 18
BRIT. ACAD. REV. 1, 7 (2011).
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and his allies are keen to collapse any distinction between law and power.8
It is an appeal to government lawyers to understand, as a matter of
professional ethics, that they have a duty to contribute to the fair and
reasonable administration of state power.
One may be tempted to say that if positive law does not regulate the
exercise of official discretion, then this power is outside the constraints of the
rule of law. Gerald Ford famously defined an impeachable offense as nothing
more than whatever a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives
says it is.9 That is too much of a concession to legal realism. The argument
in this Essay is, instead, that government officials and the lawyers who advise
them may have substantial law-conferred discretion to include nonlegal
considerations among the grounds for their decisions. In those incompletely
law-governed domains, official decision makers must nevertheless respect
the cluster of values associated with the rule of law. The rule of law restricts
the type of considerations that can be taken into account and the way they are
weighed and balanced in deliberation. To put it informally, not just any
reasons can justify a decision. Grants of executive clemency customarily
state that they are based on “good and sufficient reasons.”10 This formulation
implies that an exercise of the pardon power may be abusive if it was not
based on good and sufficient reason. For example, I believe that many share
the intuition that there is a difference between the well-exercised prerogative
of executive clemency to grant a reduction in sentence to prisoners serving
lengthy prison terms for drug possession offenses and the corruption of that
power, as critics asserted concerning President Bill Clinton’s pardon of
financier (and campaign contributor, through his ex-wife) Marc Rich.11 The
8. As was the case during the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, when the George
W. Bush administration aggressively asserted unchecked executive power, critics of the
Trump administration are once again citing Carl Schmitt’s conception of unreviewable
sovereignty. See, e.g., Quinta Jurecic, Donald Trump’s Pardon Power and the State of
Exception, LAWFARE (June 11, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/donaldtrumps-pardon-power-and-state-exception [https://perma.cc/WA9Z-BBU8]. For discussion
of Schmittian themes in the Bush (43) years, see, for example, Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699 (2006); and
David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 457
(2010).
9. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 348–49
(2010).
10. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
281, 281 (1993). Similarly, in a discussion of draft evasion, Ronald Dworkin wrote that
prosecutorial discretion “is not license—we expect prosecutors to have good reasons for
exercising it.” RONALD DWORKIN, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206, 207
(1977).
11. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, The Clinton Pardons: The Democrats; This Time,
Clintons Find Their Support Buckling from Weight of New Woes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/23/us/clinton-pardons-democrats-this-time-clintons-findtheir-support-buckling-weight.html [https://perma.cc/F2K5-8WD5]; Timothy M. Phelps,
Justice Department Plans for Wave of Crack-Cocaine Clemency Requests, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
21, 2014, 9:36 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-holder-clemencypetitions-20140421-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6M9W-SCXM]
(describing
Justice
Department clemency guidelines intended to aid prisoners sentenced before 2010, when new
sentencing guidelines came into effect that reduced disparities in sentences for possession of
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former exercise of the pardon power is backed by a good and sufficient
reason, albeit one not grounded in positive law, while the latter is not.
Similarly, one might contend that revoking the security clearance of a
political opponent who is exercising his First Amendment right to criticize
the president is not an action based on a good and sufficient reason, even
though the president otherwise has the right to revoke security clearances.12
That is the right way to think about the norms and values that inform the
role of government lawyers but, of course, a great deal rides on how “good
and sufficient reason” is defined. One might contend, in line with natural
law theorists, that legal officials are necessarily charged with an obligation
of care for the common good of the community.13 Under this conception of
legal authority, an official decision that is contrary to the common good is an
abuse of the discretion afforded by law. One very influential strand of
thinking about the value of lawyer professionalism emphasizes the social role
of lawyers in mediating between the interests of individual clients and the
common good.14 Some scholars continue to maintain that lawyers have a
responsibility to identify and promote the public interest in the course of their
representation of clients, whether public or private.15 On this account, a good
and sufficient reason for the exercise of legally conferred discretion would
be one that promotes the public interest. In the pardon example, reducing
excessive sentences imposed on (partially and to some extent unconsciously)

crack and powder cocaine). Rich’s company, a commodities trading firm based in
Switzerland, was investigated for tax evasion and obstruction of justice beginning in the early
1980s. See Susan F. Jennison, Comment, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege: Marc Rich and the Second Circuit, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 913, 920–29 (1985).
Controversy over Clinton’s pardon decision was renewed during the 2016 presidential election
campaign when the FBI released a number of documents related to the pardon of Rich, who
had died in 2013, a few days after then–FBI Director James Comey announced that the FBI
was investigating new emails possibly related to Hillary Clinton’s private server, which she
employed while serving as Secretary of State. See Jessica Taylor, More Surprises: FBI
Releases Files on Bill Clinton’s Pardon of Marc Rich, NPR (Nov. 1, 2016, 8:55 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500297580/more-surprises-fbi-releases-files-on-billclintons-pardon-of-marc-rich [https://perma.cc/XB2V-LM4T].
12. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, Trump Revokes Ex-C.I.A. Director
John Brennan’s Security Clearance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/15/us/politics/john-brennan-security-clearance.html
[https://perma.cc/EW6RRBCV].
13. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS (William P.
Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan, eds., Richard J. Regan trans., 2d ed. 2002); CICERO, ON
DUTIES (Walter Miller trans., 1913); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 154–
56 (1980); MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 85–90 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Julius Henry Cohen and the
Professions as a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33, 45–46 (2012) (describing
the position of Durkheim and Parsons on the relationship between professionals, clients, and
the common good).
15. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections
on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2006).
In later work with Eli Wald, Pearce has advocated for a “relational” approach to law practice,
in which lawyers advise clients to take account of the well-being of others. See generally Eli
Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law Practice,
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601 (2016).
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racially discriminatory grounds would plausibly be in furtherance of the
public good, while pardoning one’s wealthy crony and benefactor would not.
This Essay offers an alternative version of the public-interest criterion for
judging the sufficiency of reasons for official action in the exercise of
discretion. Building on H. L. A. Hart’s recently rediscovered essay on
discretion,16 this Essay will argue that positive law is not the only source of
constraint for government lawyers. However, this additional guidance is not
provided by substantive conceptions of the public interest, but by a more
formal, procedural value of legality. This contention sounds like a
paradoxical claim—the ideal of the rule of law informs the role of lawyers
even when there are gaps or ambiguities in positive law—but it is not
paradoxical when understood as a claim within the political ethics of the
lawyer’s role rather than a thesis about the nature of law.17 A government
lawyer, in particular, occupies a social role that is directly connected with the
task of ruling the members of a political community pursuant to a claim of
legitimate authority.18
The idea of legitimacy is very important here. As Hart emphasizes, the
discretion exercised by government officials is not the same as
unconstrained, unregulated choice.19 Discretion is choice in terms of
considerations that bear on what is appropriate to be done. It is, in principle,
16. See generally H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013); Geoffrey C.
Shaw, H. L. A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 666 (2013). Shaw’s paper situates Hart’s “Discretion” essay within the intellectual
context of the then quite influential legal process school associated with Henry Hart (no
relation), Albert Sacks, and Lon Fuller. As mentioned above, I have argued for a conception
of legal ethics that is closely tied to the rights and obligations assigned by positive law to the
lawyer’s client. See supra note 1. Engagement with (mostly sympathetic) critics of my
position has forced a reckoning with the source of guidance for lawyers where there are gaps
or ambiguities in positive law. The legal process school has proven to be full of insights for
dealing with this issue, and I have written papers of various lengths trying to incorporate legal
process thinking into positivist legal ethics. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, The Limits of
Positivist Legal Ethics: A Brief History, a Critique, and a Return to Foundations, 30
CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 443 (2017); W. Bradley Wendel, The Rule of Law and Legal-Process
Reasons in Attorney Advising, 99 B.U. L. REV. 107 (2019).
17. See Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2008) (noting the reluctance of legal philosophers to consider
Fuller’s critique of Hart on its own terms because to do so would “open the boundaries
between legal and political philosophy and complicate our sense of the separability of law and
morality”). The use of Hart here is an intentional bit of irony, since he is generally taken as
the poster child for legal positivism. Reliance on the “Discretion” essay is meant to show that
some of Hart’s views are not far from one of his rivals in jurisprudence, Lon Fuller.
18. See JOHN RAWLS, Reply to Habermas, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 372, 427–28 (1993);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 71–80 (1986). I am using the concept of legitimacy
throughout this Essay and not the closely related notions of authority and obligation. The
focus of the Essay is what considerations bear on decisions of government officials in areas
of legally conferred discretion. In some cases, the officials purport to impose obligations on
citizens, but the core instances of official discretion, such as pardoning and decisions by
prosecutors to bring charges, involve not the demand for obedience but the application or
removal of coercive state power. Thus, it seems more natural to talk in terms of legitimacy as
the rightful application (or withdrawal) of coercive force. See generally Richard Dagger,
Authority, Legitimacy, and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 24 LEGAL THEORY 77 (2018).
19. Hart, supra note 16, at 656 (distinguishing discretion from “choice (tout court)”).
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possible to justify an exercise of discretion and conclude that it was sound.20
So why not call upon government lawyers to justify their choices with
reference to beliefs about what would serve the public interest? The fear
expressed by many critics of appeals to unwritten law—which would apply
here to the appeal to unwritten norms of good governance—is that nothing
will prevent officials from making decisions on the basis of mere preferences,
unconstrained by any reliable disciplining methodology.21 The discretion
exercised by government officials, and the lawyers who advise them, must
be justified in terms of principles that bear the appropriate relationship with
the ascription of legitimacy, which is to say the right to issue directives that
carry an obligation of obedience.
I. LEGITIMACY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
The idea that the lawyer’s role is to act in the public interest when there is
room for the exercise of discretion tacitly relies upon a conception of legal
legitimacy with an ancient lineage. This is the assumption that “there is a
good for humankind that can be realized only in a society ruled by those who
know what that good is and how to pursue it.”22 Stating that assumption goes
a long way toward refuting the public interest view of the lawyer’s role.
Lawyers in general do not have privileged access to knowledge of the
common good and how to pursue it, even if a few “lawyer-statesmen” with
long experience in government and private practice may have acquired
considerable practical wisdom concerning “the public good” and “the
limitations of human beings and their political arrangements.”23 In general,
however, lawyers in government service today do not see themselves as
having particular expertise in human affairs beyond their technical
competence in legal analysis. Most observers would agree that the
nineteenth-century ideal of the legal profession mediating between the
interests of individuals and the common good has long since given way to a
more technocratic vision of lawyers as market actors who provide legal
services as desired by clients.24 One might therefore argue that in an area of
20. Id. at 657 (giving the excruciatingly middle-class English example of choice as
between having a martini or a sherry, but acknowledging that discretion might be involved if
it appealed to rational standards, for example, “I have found from experience that I get on
better when I drink [a martini] rather than sherry, I don’t talk so much”).
21. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So
Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1389
(2014). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks
and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
22. See Richard E. Flathman, Legitimacy, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 678, 678 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
23. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 12 (1993).
24. See generally Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 649 (2016). Russ Pearce and others seeking to revitalize civic republicanism as an
alternative to what they take as an excessively individual-centered, adversarial legal ethics of
political liberalism often talk in terms of the common good of the political community. See,
e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992); see also STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS &
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legally conferred discretion, the lawyer’s role is simply to acquiesce in
whatever the relevant government officials wish to do as a matter of policy,
politics, or even personal preference. But this assumes that the politicalethical role of government lawyer carries only responsibilities with respect
to positive law, not to governance more generally.25 Where the law confers
discretion, the ideal of the rule of law may impose additional ethical
requirements upon government lawyers.
To better understand the problem, one might follow Hart in asking why a
legal system should tolerate discretion at all. Hart’s answer is, quite bluntly,
“we are men not gods.”26 Any method of governing a community must
contend with certain limitations connected with the bounded rationality of
human beings; these are the “Relative Ignorance of Fact” and the “Relative
Indeterminacy of Aim.”27 The first factor, that we cannot know in advance
all the circumstances in which the application of a rule would arise, is a
familiar reason for the open-endedness of legal standards.28 There will
always be borderline cases we could not have anticipated. It may be possible
COMMUNITARIANS 220–21 (2d ed. 1996) (identifying classical republicanism with a
conception of the good of a political community that emphasizes the active participation of
citizens possessed of civic virtue). In jurisprudence, the common good is generally
encountered in connection with the natural law thesis that “the law’s reason-giving power
flows from the common good of the political community.” MURPHY, supra note 13, at 61.
25. I have argued that the primary ethical obligation of lawyers, whether representing
clients in the private sector or serving as legal advisors to government officials, is to promote
the legal entitlements of clients, as opposed to furthering their prelegal interests. See generally
WENDEL, supra note 1. Exhibiting fidelity to law in the representation of clients is a bedrock
duty of lawyers. However, I did not mean to deny that lawyers may have other responsibilities
under some circumstances.
26. Hart, supra note 16, at 661.
27. See id. at 661–63. Hart’s two examples of the way in which humans are not gods
bears striking resemblance to Rawls’s burdens of judgment (i.e., the sources of disagreement
among reasonable persons). See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 55–58. Hart’s discussion of the
dinner party hostess example refers to a number of factors distinguishing her exercise of
discretion from a mere choice; many of these factors overlap with the burdens of judgment,
including the lack of a clear principle to determine the ranking or relative importance of
constitutive values and the inability to define the aim specifically enough to prescribe
necessary means for achieving it. See Hart, supra note 16, at 659–60. Rawls introduces the
ideas of public reason and an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive
doctrines in the course of analyzing the legitimacy of the basic structure of society. There is
a proceduralist strand of Rawls’s later views, discussed in his debate with Habermas, which
connects the burdens of judgment with the need for legitimate procedures: “A legitimate
procedure is one that all may reasonably accept as free and equal when collective decisions
must be made and agreement is normally lacking. The burdens of judgment lead to that even
with reason and good will on all sides.” RAWLS, supra note 18, at 428–29. Rawls
acknowledges that procedures may be “purely procedural with respect to legitimacy” but if
laws are too unjust, they are not legitimate. Id. at 429.
28. Hart, supra note 16, at 662. Hart later developed these arguments in chapter seven of
The Concept of Law, where he explained why the open texture of legal language made legal
formalism impossible. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. VII (2d ed. 1994). An
important observation from this later work is that formalism seeks to minimize or disguise the
need for discretion. Id. at 129. But Hart warns against the attitude of rule-skepticism, which
is the antithesis of mechanical jurisprudence; the area of open texture is circumscribed, and
while there is some uncertainty at the margin of the application of rules, every rule also has a
core of settled meaning. See id. at 138, 145–47.
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to find common factors running through diverse situations and to formulate
a rule in advance based on the anticipated facts, but experience shows that
these rules often collide with novel facts that could not have been anticipated
ex ante.29 Regarding the second factor, to say a decision calls for discretion
is to presuppose that it involves a situation in which there is no clearly
definable aim, no clear standards of right and wrong. And while there may
be constitutive values or elements that bear on the decision, there is no
higher-order principle determining how these values are to be ranked or
harmonized if they conflict.30 Thus, it is a conceptual impossibility that our
lawmakers and law-appliers can serve as platonic guardians who know what
is good for society and how to pursue it.
To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical example of a relatively
senior career agency lawyer—not a political appointee—working in the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Two grocery store chains in
the northeastern United States have proposed a merger. However, the
hypothetical current president ran as a populist and an enemy of concentrated
corporate power, corruption, and monopolies. During her campaign she was
fond of quoting Theodore Roosevelt: “The great corporations . . . are the
creatures of the State, and the State not only has the right to control them, but
it is duty bound to control them wherever the need of such control is
shown.”31 She recently gave an interview in which she objected to the
merger on the ground that it would harm local businesses. “Bigger is not
always better when it comes to business,” the president said. The lawyer is
horrified. He is a staunch believer in the economic approach to antitrust law
that aims at protecting competition, not competitors. Judge Learned Hand
once wrote, “It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to
prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his
own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must
accept the direction of a few.”32 In the lawyer’s judgment, however, Hand’s
approach is outmoded and the wrong way to understand the goals of antitrust
law. After extensive reading and reflection, he has been persuaded by the
arguments of then-Professor Robert Bork:
Hand’s notion, moreover, is dubious, and indeed radical, social policy. It
would be hard to demonstrate that the independent druggist or groceryman
is any more solid and virtuous a citizen than the local manager of a chain
operation. The notion that such persons are entitled to special consideration
by the state is an ugly demand for class privilege. It hardly seems suited to
the United States, whose dominant ideal, though doubtless too often flouted
in legislative practice, has been that each business should survive only by
serving consumers as they want to be served.33
29. See Hart, supra note 16, at 663–64.
30. Id. at 659.
31. See Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Providence, Rhode Island (August 23, 1902), in
1 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 98, 103 (1910).
32. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
33. Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
363, 370 (1965).
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The question is, put simply, what the lawyer should do with his views
about economic policy. Suppose the lawyer is highly experienced and
knowledgeable about antitrust law and the government’s enforcement
practices. The lawyer reasonably believes that an unequivocal statement in
support of the merger by senior agency lawyers would take some of the wind
out of the president’s opposition to it. The lawyer also is a savvy enough
operator to understand available strategies of resistance—not full-blown,
open disobedience,34 but bureaucratic techniques like papering the file to
death, placing the matter on a low-priority schedule, or leaking details about
internal opposition to friendly journalists.
To answer this question, consider the values and obligations on both sides.
On the side of supporting the merger (that is, opposing the president) are not
just the lawyer’s “personal” beliefs and commitments. There is an
unfortunate tendency when talking about ethics to assert the lawyer’s
position regarding ethical obligations as a matter of personal subjective
beliefs about the common good. The lawyer in the hypothetical, however,
believes that the common good would in fact be furthered by interpreting
antitrust statutes to promote competition rather than to protect competitors.
On the other side, however, is the president’s position about what would be
in the public interest.35 The seeming impasse between the two positions is
resolved, however, by the existence of procedures for determining, at least
for present purposes, the content of the public interest. The tiebreaker, so to
speak, is the legitimacy of the decision.36
Hart’s argument, that discretion is inevitable because of normative
pluralism and bounded rationality, is not the only explanation for creating
legally sanctioned zones of discretion. Picking up on the distinction between
rules and standards in legal reasoning,37 one might contend instead that

34. See Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the
Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601, 609 (2013).
35. See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83, 86 (1998) (“One person’s political bias is another person’s democratically
sanctioned policy change.”).
36. See Miller, supra note 21, at 1294 (“[A]n agency attorney acts unethically when she
substitutes her individual moral judgment for that of a political process which is generally
accepted as legitimate.”). The author of the astonishing anonymous op-ed published in the
New York Times makes this mistake in part. See Opinion, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside
the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/
opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html
[https://perma.cc/CPH6-WLNR].
He or she claims that “many of the senior officials in [Trump’s] own administration are
working diligently from within to frustrate parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations.” Id.
One problem, according to the author, is that “the president shows little affinity for ideals long
espoused by conservatives: free minds, free markets and free people.” Id. But Trump ran as
a populist, not a doctrinaire free-market conservative; it should not be surprising that some of
his policy positions are contrary to those of the Republican establishment. The anonymous
official is not justified in covertly subverting the president’s efforts to impose tariffs on
imported aluminum, for example.
37. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy,
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discretion is intended to shift power from the judiciary to government
officials in the executive branch. There is a vast scholarly literature on
political-branch interpretation of the constitution and statutory law.38
Significantly, the debate pertains to the identity of the institutional actor who
should be charged with responsibility for reaching a conclusion about the
proper interpretation of the law. Descriptively speaking, it may be the case
that the president’s power has increased as effective checks have eroded,
either from the judiciary or from intrabranch sources of constraint.39 Bruce
Ackerman’s 2010 book on presidential power,40 dismissed by some as
alarmist,41 now seems prescient in the Trump years. Ackerman made these
arresting predictions:
I predict that: (1) the evolving system of presidential nominations will
lead to the election of an increasing number of charismatic outsider types
who gain office by mobilizing activist support for extremist programs of
the left or the right; (2) all presidents, whether extremist or mainstream,
will rely on media consultants to design streams of sound bites aimed at
narrowly segmented micropublics, generating a politics of unreason that
will often dominate public debate; (3) they will increasingly govern
through their White House staff of superloyalists, issuing executive orders
that their staffers will impose on the federal bureaucracy even when they
conflict with congressional mandates; (4) they will engage with an
increasingly politicized military in ways that may greatly expand their
effective power to put their executive orders into force throughout the
nation; (5) they will legitimate their unilateral actions through an expansive
use of emergency powers, and (6) assert “mandates from the People” to
evade or ignore congressional statutes when public opinion polls support
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
38. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most
Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Sanford
Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael
Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993);
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1189 (2006); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994);
Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,
103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power: Polycentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the
Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410 (1993).
39. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1112–14 (2013) (describing the
positions of scholars who contend that the law does very little to constrain the powers of the
president).
40. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).
41. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688
(2011) (reviewing Ackerman’s book).
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decisive action; (7) they will rely on elite lawyers in the executive branch
to write up learned opinions that vindicate the constitutionality of their most
blatant power grabs.42

The seventh prediction is the aspect of this dystopian vision—arguably being
played out daily—that concerns lawyers, legal ethics, and jurisprudence.
And the concern of this paper in particular is what distinguishes a “blatant
power grab[]” from the rightful exercise of power.
II. LEGITIMACY AS REASON-GIVING
Power exercised without respect for the principle of legality lacks
legitimacy and authority.43 The president may be able to do something, but
that alone does not mean it is a rightful exercise of power. In The Concept
of Law, Hart famously distinguished the command of a gunman—“hand over
your money or I’ll shoot”—from an utterance that creates a genuine
obligation.44 The rightful (that is, legitimate) exercise of power is justified
by reasons that its subjects can endorse from their perspective as free and
equal. That is the significance of the passage quoted above, which connects
the dignity of people who live under the law with the requirement that lawful
authority be backed by reasons that are not reducible to a threat of
punishment. Hart went on to give an elaborate theoretical account of one
way in which lawful authority can be exercised—namely, through a system
of primary and secondary rules in which there is a rule of recognition,
accepted as a standard by legal officials, specifying criteria of legal validity.45
This is, of course, a paradigm case of a theory of legal positivism.46 But it
would be a mistake to view Hart’s focus on positive law as the only way to
connect the moral conception of people as free and equal bearers of dignity
with the political ideal that official power should be exercised in ways that
42. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 9. The one feature of Trump’s assertion of unchecked
power that Ackerman failed to predict is his ceaseless efforts to delegitimize the press by
referring to journalists as “enemies of the people.” See, e.g., Rebecca Morin, Trump Labels
Media “The Opposition Party” as Newspapers Push Back En Masse, POLITICO (Aug. 16,
2018, 10:29 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/16/trump-calls-media-fake-newsas-newspapers-push-back-against-claim-779555 [https://perma.cc/V85A-QJQB]; Amber
Philips, The Fix: Sarah Sanders Presents the Official White House Policy: The Media Is the
Enemy of the People, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2018/08/02/sarah-sanders-presents-the-official-white-house-policy-the-media-isthe-enemy-of-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/E93Z-6UGM] (reporting that, four times in two
days, the White House Press Secretary refused to state that Trump does not consider the press
the enemy of the people).
43. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 3 (2011).
44. HART, supra note 28, at 82–91 (using the phrase “is obliged” to refer to the effect of
the gunman’s threat).
45. Id. at 116.
46. The core claim of legal positivism is often stated as the Sources Thesis (following
Joseph Raz): the existence and content of law can be determined by social facts alone, without
resort to any evaluative (including moral) argument. See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and
Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 210, 211 (1995); see also Jules Coleman, Negative
and Positive Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 3, 5 (2002) (proposing the
separability thesis, that “there exists at least one conceivable rule of recognition . . . that does
not specify truth as a moral principle among the truth conditions for any proposition of law”).
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respect the dignity of citizens.47 Indeed, as Hart himself well understood, to
say something is a law according to the criteria of validity of a legal system’s
rule of recognition is not yet to give a reason that the law ought to be
obeyed.48 In his debate with Lon Fuller, Hart faulted German lawyers during
the Nazi era for failing to observe the distinction between legal validity and
authority.49
The rule of law depends not only on positive law to establish a substantive
position, in the name of society as a whole, regarding public policy issues.
The law also presents itself to its subjects as a rational basis for establishing
order, as opposed to the arbitrary commands of a ruler, and as a means of
facilitating participation and democratic self-government.50 To insist upon
the reasonableness of law and its administration is to acknowledge the
rational agency and dignity of the citizens of a political community:
[L]aw has a dignitarian aspect: it conceives of the people who live under
it as bearers of reason and intelligence. They are thinkers who can grasp
and grapple with the rationale of the way they are governed and relate it in
complex but intelligible ways to their own view of the relation between
their actions and purposes and the actions and purposes of the state.51

The central insight here is that the law’s function for its subjects, as free and
equal, reasonable agents, is to promote their flourishing—one aspect of
which is a mutually beneficial social order.52 As John Finnis puts it, the
question for the subjects of law is, what is the significance, from the point of
view of practical reasonableness, of the fact that a political authority has
stated that something shall be done? The answer turns on the “importance of
law as a specific way of realizing a fundamental element of the common
good, viz. a fair, predictable, positively collaborative, and flexibly stable
order of human interrelationships.”53
47. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT:
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO ‘THE CONCEPT OF LAW’ 311, 350–52 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001)
(noting that Raz, also a legal positivist, offers a normative explanatory account of law that
emphasizes its claim of authority, which gives its subjects reasons for action).
48. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 617–18 (1957).
49. Id. at 618 (“[E]verything that [German legal theorist Gustav Radbruch] says is really
dependent upon an enormous overvaluation of the importance of the bare fact that a rule may
be said to be a valid rule of law, as if this, once declared, was conclusive of the final moral
question: ‘Ought this rule of law to be obeyed?’”).
50. See Waldron, Procedure, supra note 7, at 18–19.
51. Id. at 19.
52. See George Duke, Finnis on the Authority of Law and the Common Good, 19 LEGAL
THEORY 44, 51–53 (2013).
53. FINNIS, supra note 13, at 335. Lon Fuller is well known for his claim that a system of
governance deserves to be called a legal system only if the directives of a ruler satisfy formal
criteria such as generality, prospectivity, publicity, and clarity; confusingly, he referred to
these standards as a kind of morality. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—a Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 644–45 (1958); see also LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 33–42 (1964). Finnis’s use of Fuller-type criteria shows that these criteria
are best understood not as necessary or sufficient conditions for calling some norm an instance
of “law,” but instead are related to considerations of practical reasonableness that support the
authority of a legal system. See FINNIS, supra note 13, at 335.
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Again, it is worth emphasizing Hart’s awareness that the criteria for the
existence of a legal system (general obedience of valid law plus acceptance,
from the internal point of view, of the rule of recognition by officials)54 are
one thing, and the conditions for legal legitimacy are another. Hart
acknowledges that the allegiance of citizens to a legal system may have
diverse grounds, including considerations of long-term self-interest, altruism,
conformity, or unthinking adherence to tradition.55 A society characterized
by “deplorably sheeplike” attitudes on the part of its members may
nevertheless have valid law.56 From this, however, it does not follow that
people subject to the requirements of valid law have a moral obligation of
obedience.57 The rightful exercise of power, and a corresponding obligation
on the part of its subjects, requires something beyond the existence of a legal
system. Being clear on what this “something else” is can therefore shed
needed light on the nature of the ethical obligations of government officials
and their legal advisors.
The political ideal of the rule of law informs the obligation of both lawyers
and the government officials with whom they interact. The lawyer in our
antitrust hypothetical does have a reasoned basis for supporting the merger
and opposing the president. The problem is simply that the president has a
different reasoned basis, and in our constitutional structure, the president’s
view is entitled to prevail. That is a relatively easy case. The more difficult
ethical issue arises in a situation in which the president, or another highranking government official, directs a lawyer to assist in doing something
that is within the official’s discretion. For example, suppose the president
directs an investigation or prosecution of a political opponent58 or grants a
54. HART, supra note 28, at 116–17.
55. Id. at 203.
56. Id. at 117.
57. See Jeremy Waldron, All We Like Sheep, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 169, 184–85
(1999) (discussing Hart’s views on legal obligation and authority).
58. Trump continues to lead chants of “lock her up” at political rallies, referring to his
campaign pledge to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate corruption by Hillary Clinton.
See, e.g., Jason Le Miere, Trump Responds to Hillary Clinton “Lock Her Up” Chants: “Some
Things Just Take a Little Bit Longer,” NEWSWEEK (Aug. 3, 2018, 9:40 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-lock-her-hillary-clinton-1056282 [http://perma.cc/4KH5G92B]. Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions has also encouraged audiences in the chant.
See Julia Jacobs, Jeff Sessions Laughs and Echoes ‘Lock Her Up’ Chant with Conservative
High Schoolers, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/
us/politics/jeff-sessions-lock-her-up-hillary-clinton.html
[https://perma.cc/8GXC-CPCE].
Trump has a long-running vendetta against Jeff Bezos, the owner of both Amazon and the
Washington Post. He has criticized the U.S. Postal Service for what he believes are unfairly
low rates charged to Amazon for package delivery and ordered a review of the Postal Service’s
finances after claiming that the Washington Post was a lobbyist for Amazon. See, e.g., Eli
Rosenberg, Trump Said Amazon Cost the USPS “Billions.” But the Post Office Has a Different
Explanation., WASH. POST (May 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2018/05/11/trump-said-amazon-cost-the-usps-billions-but-the-post-office-hasa-different-explanation/ [https://perma.cc/79WN-76VR]; Michael D. Shear, Trump, Having
Denounced Amazon’s Shipping Deal, Orders Review of Postal Service, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/us/politics/trump-postal-service-amazon.html
[https://perma.cc/3QUT-JKZB]. Trump has also retaliated against perceived opponents who
were previously high-ranking officials in national security agencies by revoking or threatening

2008

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

pardon to a campaign contributor or a political ally. For the principle of
legality to inform the duties of government officials and lawyers, it must have
something to do not only with the making and interpretation of positive law,
but with the exercise of power in zones of legally conferred discretion. Apart
from the specific requirements of positive law, the dignitarian aspects of the
rule of law require that official power be exercised according to reasons that
are related to the good of a “fair, predictable, positively collaborative, and
flexibly stable order of human interrelationships.”59
Lawyers can promote fairness, predictability, and stability indirectly by
participating in processes that promote reasoned, nonarbitrary, and hence
legitimate decisions by government officials.60 As Waldron notes,
influential conceptions of the rule of law tend to emphasize certainty,
predictability, and the determinacy of public norms.61 This emphasis comes
at the expense of the dialogic or argumentative aspect of the “government
treating ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.”62
Waldron and other scholars, including David Luban and Daniel Markovits,
have therefore sought to give pride of place to litigation and adjudicative
procedures as a means of manifesting respect for the self-determining agency
of free and equal citizens.63 But relatively little has been said about decisionmaking procedures within organizations generally, and the executive branch
of government specifically, and how these procedures relate to democracy
and human dignity. Neal Katyal’s celebration of the virtues of bureaucracy
offers a suggestion for how this connection can be drawn. He observes that
there are two competing sources of legitimacy within the executive branch—
political will and expertise.64 The president’s exercise of prerogatives such
as pardoning and directing prosecutorial resources may be thought of as a
manifestation of democratic energy; left unchecked, however, it becomes a
source of arbitrary power. Because the president’s prerogatives respond to
considerations of democratic legitimacy, they should not be interfered with
because of disagreement on policy grounds. That was the point of the
to revoke their security clearances. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, Trump
Revokes Ex-C.I.A. Director John Brennan’s Security Clearance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/us/politics/john-brennan-security-clearance.html
[https://perma.cc/QV5B-YVWU].
59. FINNIS, supra note 13, at 335.
60. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Cornelia Pillard,
Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J.
1297 (2006).
61. Waldron, Procedure, supra note 7, at 21.
62. Id. at 22.
63. Id. at 23–24; see also DAVID LUBAN, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When
They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 65, 72–73 (2007)
(arguing that respecting dignity requires presuming that litigants have a story to tell in good
faith); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 176–77, 180–87 (2008) (seeking to establish a connection between political
legitimacy and the agency of citizens by relying on litigation to foster an effective engagement
with democratic processes).
64. Katyal, supra note 60, at 2317.

2019]

DISCRETION MEETS LEGITIMACY

2009

antitrust example: the president is entitled to his or her own views about the
enforcement of antitrust policy, provided, of course, that they are within the
bounds of legally conferred discretion.
The exercise of discretion must be rational in order to be legitimate. As
Hart writes in his essay on discretion:
[I]t [is] not too much to say that decisions involving discretion are rational
primarily because of the manner in which they are made, but of course the
word “manner” here must be understood to include not only narrowly
procedural factors and the deliberate exclusion of private interest,
prejudice, and the use of experience in the field but also the determined
effort to identify what are the various values which have to be considered
and subjected in the course of discretion to some form of compromise or
subordination.65

The arguments supporting the exercise of discretion must be rational, even if
not conclusive.66 Therefore, one of the fundamental obligations of a
government lawyer serving in an advisory capacity is to identify competing
values and subject them to a process of weighing, balancing, and
compromise. This process ensures that the resulting decision will not be one
with which all observers will agree—otherwise there would be no room for
the exercise of discretion—but will be one with respect to which an observer
should be able to conclude, “[t]hat was a satisfactory compromise between
different values.”67 Returning to the example of President Clinton’s pardon
of Marc Rich, the pardon was arguably not based on “good and sufficient
reasons,” not because of any policy preference revealed by the pardon, but
because it did not represent a reasoned choice among the types of
considerations that ought to bear on this exercise of discretion. In an op-ed
published in the New York Times, Clinton defended his decision by noting
that others who had structured transactions in the same way had been sued
civilly rather than being indicted and that Rich had acted on the advice of
prominent tax experts.68 But this is a fairly thin reed since enforcement
agencies often have the choice to pursue civil or criminal penalties.69 Given
the allegations of a quid pro quo for Rich’s ex-wife’s campaign contributions,
Clinton did not offer a particularly persuasive justification that appealed to
the relevant values for his exercise of the pardon power. Those values are
generally believed to include moving beyond a time of particular social and
political upheaval or controversy (for example, pardoning Vietnam-era draft
evaders or President Ford’s pardon of President Nixon after the Watergate
crisis to allow the nation to move beyond the controversy), rectifying past

65. Hart, supra note 16, at 664.
66. See id. at 665.
67. Id.
68. William Jefferson Clinton, Opinion, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
18, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/opinion/my-reasons-for-the-pardons.html
[https://perma.cc/B2H7-W4GC].
69. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.250 (2018) (“Non-Criminal
Alternatives to Prosecution”).
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injustices, or recognizing that someone has long since paid his debt to
society.70 They do not include helping out one’s political allies.
The crucial analytical work lies in the specification of which values bear
on the exercise of discretion. Consider as an example some of the factors
listed in the Justice Manual (previously known as the U.S. Attorneys’
Manual), which pertain to another discretionary decision by government
officials, namely, the decision to prosecute. When deciding whether to bring
criminal charges, lawyers for the government are directed to take account of
factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, the deterrent effect
of prosecution, the culpability of the defendant, the defendant’s criminal
history, and the impact of the offense on victims.71 Government attorneys
are specifically prohibited from taking into account their own personal
feelings or the defendant’s race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, sexual
orientation, or political associations, activities, or beliefs.72 The Justice
Manual is for the internal guidance of Justice Department lawyers, so it is
not a source of positive law; the point, however, is that the considerations it
identifies are values relating closely to the fair administration of a system of
criminal justice. The values that should guide discretion in the absence of
constraint by positive law are those that would inform the deliberation of a
rational decision maker, and what makes them rational is the belief that they
would be considerations that could be accepted (or not reasonably rejected)
from the point of view of those subject to official power. The values may be
political in the sense that they are contested in our society and the competing
parties may align differently with respect to these values73—consider, again,
the hypothetical of the lawyer who was horrified by the president’s populism
and would have preferred a Chicago-school law-and-economics approach to
antitrust policy. It is essential, however, that these values bear on the exercise
of power in the appropriate manner. The analysis of the sufficiency of
reasons given for the exercise of discretionary authority must take account of
the relationship between the reasons and the purpose for which official power
is exercised.
CONCLUSION
I have tried to avoid turning this Essay into yet another call for some
political institution to play a stabilizing role while President Trump crashes
around like a bull in a china shop. In an ordinary presidency, the nature of
the reasons that must be given in support of a presidential pardon, or to justify
the decision to commence an investigation or prosecution, would be an
interesting jurisprudential puzzle, but of no real urgency. The reason is that
70. See generally Richard A. Saliterman, Reflections on the Presidential Clemency
Power, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1985).
71. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 69, § 9-27.230.
72. Id. § 9-27.260.
73. Mark Tushnet puts it nicely, considering Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty and the
state of exception: “in [a] state[] of exception, law is displaced” by either power or politics.
See Mark Tushnet, Meditations on Carl Schmitt, 40 GA. L. REV. 877, 882 (2006). I disagree
with Tushnet’s contention that power and politics are equivalent.

2019]

DISCRETION MEETS LEGITIMACY

2011

well-functioning institutions incorporate procedures for vetting official
decisions, subjecting them to some degree of adversarial testing, and
resolving disagreements in good faith. The result will usually be a reasoned
decision and, when a discretionary act comes in for criticism, it is often the
case that the usual procedures had broken down or were circumvented.74 One
of the signal characteristics of the Trump administration is the president’s
unconcern with ordinary vetting processes; Bob Woodward’s look inside the
White House is only the latest account of decisions made impulsively and
often delivered via Twitter, without adequate consideration of alternatives,
which inevitably led to frantic scrambling by staffers to contain the damage
or reverse the decision.75 Government lawyers have a significant role to play
in guiding the exercise of official discretion in most presidential
administrations. That role is to ensure that the relevant values are given due
consideration and the resulting decision represents a reasoned ranking or
compromise among relevant factors. In the present administration, however,
lawyers may be spending more time doing damage control or trying to
restrain the impulses of a president who seems to believe that governing is
nothing more than issuing directives.

74. Significantly, the New York Times editors appended a note to President Clinton’s
explanation of his reasons for pardoning Marc Rich. Clinton said he had asked three
Republican lawyers, Leonard Garment, William Bradford Reynolds, and Lewis Libby, to
review the pardon application. In fact, however, the three lawyers had not reviewed the
application. See Clinton, supra note 68.
75. See Jill Abramson, Bob Woodward’s Meticulous, Frightening Look Inside the Trump
White House, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/bobwoodwards-meticulous-frightening-look-inside-the-trump-white-house/2018/09/06/b30ebc5
e-b1e6-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html [https://perma.cc/TKU5-N9ML] (reporting on,
among other events, Trump’s refusal to consider a memo setting out four options regarding
military service by transgender people, his tweet proclaiming his decision to ban them, and
the subsequent pushback by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense).

